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Abstract 
The literature on peacekeeping has paid scant attention to the interaction between 
peacekeeping troops and host country military. Addressing this gap in scholarly knowledge, 
this paper conceptualizes such interaction as Ôdiagonal interoperabilityÕ. The latter is situated 
in-between Ôhorizontal interoperabilityÕ on the one hand, relating to interaction between 
different components of a peacekeeping mission, and Ôvertical interoperabilityÕ on the other, 
referring to the relations between international peacekeepers and Ôpeace-keptÕ populations. 
The paper focuses on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where UN forces and the 
Congolese army are engaged in joint military operations and army reform is part of the 
peacekeeping missionÕs mandate. Studying both mutual representations and joint practices, 
the paper explores the organizational, political, discursive, and security-related factors that 
shape diagonal interoperability. It concludes that diagonal interoperability between the two 
forces is weak, as reflected in mutual distrust and Ônot-so jointÕ joint operations. Perhaps 
suprisingly, it finds that shared military identities do not seem to facilitate collaboration. 
Rather, mutual perceptions of the Ômilitary OtherÕ are infused with discourses of cultural and 
political difference, therefore accentuating the power asymmetries that undermine diagonal 
interoperability.  
 
Key words: diagonal interoperability; UN peacekeeping; security sector reform; DR Congo, 
MONUSCO 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A growing body of work studies the micro-dynamics and socio-cultural aspects of 
peacekeeping establishments and their interaction with the populations of so-called host 
countries.
1
 Two lines of enquiry dominate this emerging field of study: the first examines the 
relations between peacekeeping personnel, in particular between different national 
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contingents or between military and civilian components.
 2
 The second focuses on 
peacekeepersÕ interaction with host country societies, and studies, among other dimensions, 
everyday social and security practices and how these relate to mutual perceptions and the 
production of security and insecurity.
3
 This last strand encompasses the growing literature on 
Ôpeacekeeping economiesÕ, referring to the socio-economic spaces of peacekeeping that are 
constituted by the day-to-day interactions between Ôthe internationalÕ and Ôthe localÕ.
4
 While 
covering a rich and expanding range of themes and approaches, to date, this emerging body of 
mostly sociological and anthropological literature on peacekeeping has paid scant attention to 
the interactions between international peacekeeping troops on the one hand, and host 
countriesÕ national armed forces on the other. Given that it involves two sets of military 
actors, these interactions differ from those between host country (civilian) populations and 
peacekeeping troops. Since host country military is not integrated in the peacekeeping 
mission, they also diverge from the military-to-military interactions found within 
multinational peacekeeping missions.   
The near-absence of elaborate studies on the relations between peacekeeping and host 
country troops is remarkable, not least as these relations have substantial security 
implications. Contacts between peacekeeping and national troops generally occur in the 
framework of efforts to fulfil mission mandates, like stabilization or securing elections. 
Moreover, national armed forces in (post)conflict zones often undergo a process of 
restructuration or reform in which the peacekeeping mission is involved. In some cases, 
peacekeeping troops also execute joint security tasks with host country military, for example 
joint patrols and military operations against armed groups. Studying the relations between 
host country and peacekeeping troops may provide important insights into the modalities and 
outcomes of these joint activities, and into the extent to which peacekeeping missions are able 
to fulfil their mandates more generally. It is also crucial for assessing the workings and effects 
of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) on United Nations Support to Non-
United Nations Security Forces that was issued at the end of 2011. Only the in-depth study of 
the overall relations between peacekeeping and non-UN forces will allow for assessing the 
(potential) impact of this policy on the human rights record of non-UN forces, and its wider 
effects on collaboration with those forces.  
This paper provides one such an in-depth study, focusing on the interaction between 
Pakistani and Indian blue helmets of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, the Mission de lÕOrganisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation 
en Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) and personnel of the Congolese armed 
forces, the Forces Armes de la Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo (FARDC). How do UN 
and Congolese troops interact with and perceive each other? What factors inform these 
images and practices and how? More specifically, what is the role of discourses (e.g. around 
national and military culture), political factors (e.g. unequal power relations), organizational 
modalities (e.g. living and working conditions) and security-related factors (e.g. differential 
security performances) in shaping the level of interoperability between these two forces? 
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While not unique, the case of the Congo is particularly relevant due to MONUSCOÕs 
emphasis on support to and collaboration with the FARDC within its approach to stabilization 
and statebuilding. In the light of the FARDCÕs poor human rights record and organizational 
shape, however, this collaboration has evoked political and ethical questions. In particular, it 
has raised doubts concerning the extent to which it is reconcilable with MONUSCOÕs civilian 
protection mandate and jeopardizes its neutrality and impartiality.
5
 Furthermore, UNÐFARDC 
collaboration seems to rest upon as yet unproven assumptions, in particular that the 
performance and behaviour of the host countryÕs troops would be influenced by their 
exposure to the international peacekeeping force. While this contribution is an exploratory 
study and does not allow for a definite assessment of these assumptions, its findings do 
enhance the understanding of the general relations between the two forces, which is a 
prerequisite for grasping possible behavioural impact. The issue of impact is also of specific 
concern to the HRDDP, which states that the goal of UN support to non-UN forces is Ôto help 
recipients to attain a stage where compliance with these [i.e. human rights] principles and 
bodies of law becomes the norm, ensured by the rule of lawÕ.
6
  
The paper is structured as follows. After providing a brief explanation on data 
collection, it discusses relevant theoretical frameworks and bodies of literature. The next 
section reviews FARDCÐMONUSCO relations at the macro level, and the ways these 
relations are shaped by factors internal to MONUSCO and the UN system, and those related 
to the CongoÕs political environment. Subsequently, the paper zooms in on the micro level, 
exploring first the mutual representations held by officers of the FARDC and MONUSCOÕs 
Pakistani and Indian contingents, and then discussing their experiences of joint operations and 
security activities. The concluding analysis reflects upon the low level of interoperability 
between the two forces, and suggests viewing their relationship in the light of divergent 
approaches to the notion of Ô(pretended) partnershipÕ. 
 
Brief note on data collection 
 
Most of the data for this article were gathered during fourteen months of field research 
conducted between 2010 and 2012 in a variety of operational zones in North and South Kivu, 
in particular in zones of deployment of the Pakistani and Indian contingents of MONUSCO. 
The article also draws on additional fieldwork conducted between 2014 and 2016 in South 
Kivu. Methods of data collection included formal interviews, informal conversations and 
observations made around UN and FARDC bases. Although the research prior to 2014 mainly 
aimed to study micro-level interactions between the Congolese military and civilians, the 
impact of the presence of UN military on the practices of the FARDC towards civilians was 
one of the factors studied. To that end, 19 peacekeepers, all of whom were officers of the 
Pakistani and Indian contingents, were contacted on their views on FARDC behaviour and 
joint activities in their area of responsibility. While some respondents were approached at the 
level of the headquarters (HQ) of MONUSCOÕs South Kivu Brigade in Bukavu (which is 
dominated by the Pakistani contingent) and of the North Kivu Brigade in Goma (dominated 
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by the Indian contingent), the majority were contacted in different COBs (Company 
Operating Bases) in the Kivus. COBs are semi-permanent bases that host one company 
(between 75 and 175 troops) of a single national peacekeeping contingent. They are placed 
under the command of the battalion of which they form part (which is part of a national 
contingent, as reflected in the names ÔPakBattÕ and ÔIndBattÕ), the HQ of which is located at a 
Main Operating Base (MOB, with support company totalling up to 400 troops). One of the 
COBs visited hosted the Training Task Force (TTF) responsible for conducting training with 
the FARDC in South Kivu. It was deemed important to contact the TTF to gauge 
peacekeepersÕ perceptions on the process and effects of (attempted) knowledge and skills 
transfer. Most of the officers visited at the field-level operating bases appeared to have limited 
interaction with peacekeepers from other nationalities, operating primarily within the 
framework of their national contingent. Each of these national contingents has its own 
worldviews, professional identities, norms and values, and visions on peacekeeping, as rooted 
in the national armed forces of which they form part.
7
 The findings of this study can therefore 
not be generalized to MONUSCO peacekeepers as a whole.  
On the side of the Congolese armed forces, in-depth discussions on MONUSCO were 
held with about 35 officers, who were part of a wider sample of 150 military personnel 
interviewed between 2010 and 2012.
8
 It should be emphasized that most of the research was 
conducted before the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a unit consisting 
uniquely of African troops that was deployed to North Kivu in 2013 as part of MONUSCO to 
conduct targeted offensive operations against armed groups. Therefore, the FARDC 
perceptions of MONUSCO presented herein are not based on experiences with the FIB. 
FARDC officers were contacted along the command chain, including at the HQ of the 
Military Regions of North and South Kivu, the HQs of the operational sectors and sub-sectors 
located within these regions, and at the level of field-based units, ranging from brigade (from 
2011, regiment) to battalion to platoon to company.
9
  
Given the FARDCÕs nature as an amalgamation of (former) government and rebel 
troops, efforts were made to contact both officers who had always served in the government 
forces and those coming from different armed groups. At the time of the 2010Ð2012 field 
research, certain former armed groups who had recently been integrated into the army 
constituted parallel command chains, implying that their troops and officers were loyal and 
responded to their former armed group hierarchy, even while formally part of a new command 
structure. While the cohesion of the army had always been weak due to competing power 
factions intersecting with formal command chains, this time, such divisions were accentuated 
by the fact that some of the former armed groups maintained distinct identities, interests and 
worldviews.
10
 Despite this, few differences were observed in respect of the views expressed 
towards MONUSCO between officers from Ôex-governmentÕ or ex-armed group factions. 
Where such differences were detected, they related primarily to levels of education (with 
higher educated officers speaking in more nuanced terms about MONUSCO) and personal 
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experiences with MONUSCO, irrespective of military background. Given the relatively 
balanced composition of the sample of FARDC officers interviewed for this research, and the 
substantial amount of FARDC personnel contacted between 2010 and 2016, it was deemed 
safe to generalize findings up to the level of the FARDC as a whole. Due to the sensitive 
nature of the research, and as respondents were guaranteed anonymity, the location and exact 
date of the interviews are withheld herein to avoid identification.  
 
Studying Ôdiagonal interoperabilityÕ 
 
Rubinstein et al.
11
 make a distinction between on the one hand, Ôhorizontal interoperabilityÕ, 
relating to the interaction between different components of a peacekeeping mission, and on 
the other hand, Ôvertical interoperabilityÕ, characterizing the interaction between international 
peacekeepers and host country populations. Being in-between these two sets of relations, this 
paper proposes to conceptualize the nature of the interaction between UN and host country 
military as Ôdiagonal interoperabilityÕ. Given that this form of interoperability is likely to 
shareÐby approximationÐseveral characteristics of vertical and horizontal interoperability, the 
bodies of literature on these phenomena offer a useful entry point to its study. 
The extant literature distinguishes four broad clusters of factors that shape the 
interaction both among peacekeeping troops and between these troops and their deployment 
environment. These clusters should not be seen as mutually exclusive, for they may partly 
overlap. They encompass 1) factors pertaining to culture, discourse, and forms of social 
identification, and how these notions shape and are shaped by everyday practices; 2) political 
factors, notably relating to geopolitics and global power asymmetries, as well as the political 
contexts of troop-contributing and host countries; 3) factors relating to the security 
environment, including perceptions of security performance and military professionalism and 
how these perceptions co-create security and insecurity; and 4) (formal) organizational and 
coordinating mechanisms, such as command structures, standard operating procedures, and 
institutions to regulate civilÐmilitary cooperation.  
Analysing troop interaction within multinational peacekeeping forces in a 
comprehensive manner, Elron et al. identify a wide range of factors that shape the integration 
of such forces.
12
 They divide these into Ôintegrating conditionsÕ and Ôintegrating mechanismsÕ, 
respectively. The principal integrating conditions include: a common military culture; the 
structural similarities between military forces in terms of hierarchical and bureaucratic set-up; 
shared conditions and experiences, in particular uncertainty and foreignness; and integrative 
missions in the form of pursuing shared objectives. Concerning integrative mechanisms, the 
main elements identified encompass: joint operations and training, including cross-cultural 
training; internal divisions of labour; formal coordinating mechanisms; and shared 
information flows and knowledge.  
In a subsequent piece that elaborates on RubinsteinÕs work on the cultural dimensions 
of peacekeeping,
13
 Ben-Ari and Elron highlight how shared professional identities facilitate 
																																								 																				
11
 Rubinstein et al.,ÔCulture and Interoperability in Integrated missionsÕ.	
12
 Elron et al., ÔWhy Don't They Fight Each Other?Õ 
13
 Rubinstein, ÔCultural Aspects of PeacekeepingÕ. 
	 6	
military-to-military interaction.
14
 However, similar to Duffey,
15
 they also find that the 
organizational set-up and cultural aspects of multinational peacekeeping missions tend to 
accentuate the importance of Ônational cultureÕ, and of national differences in security styles. 
As they observe, multinational missions foster homogenizing and essentialist interpretations 
of Ônational cultureÕ, which are moreover informed by the dichotomy between 
Ôcivilized/developedÕ vs. Ôun(der)developed/uncivilizedÕ spaces. Thus, countries become 
conceptualized as Ôentities that are arranged along continuums of superior and inferior nation-
statesÕ,
16
 based on criteria like levels of technological advancement, military style and 
behaviour. The resulting (perceived) differences are often linked to national contingentsÕ 
unequal access to military and financial resources, like differences in pay.
17
 
Higate and Henry detect a similar imprint of stereotypes on military-to-military 
interaction.
18
  In their study, officers from Ôwhite European backgroundsÕ would often 
construct peacekeeping troops from Ôdeveloping countriesÕ as underperforming or not living 
up to the same (professional) standards. Similar stereotyped framings were adopted by host 
country populations, who would assess military professionalism and security performance 
against peacekeepersÕ national identities. Based on these findings, Higate and Henry conclude 
that racialized, nationalist and ethnicized forms of identification overdetermine perceptions of 
security styles and performance. The connection between national identity and perceived 
security performance, however, is never straightforward. Not only are perceptions of security 
performance shaped by a range of different factors, including geopolitical imperatives, ethnic 
and racialized imaginaries, and actual security activities, the interplay between these factors is 
complex and its outcomes contingent.
19
 
Aside from discourses, identities and security practices, the literature on the everyday 
interaction between peacekeepers and their civilian deployment environment highlights a 
series of institutional and organizational elements that shape mutual perceptions and relations. 
The most important of these are the factors underlying the so-called peacekeeping bubble, or 
the relative isolation of peacekeepers from the societies to which they are deployed.
 20
 These 
factors include modes of personnel recruitment, which lead to peacekeepers not speaking 
local languages and having limited knowledge of the context; specific spatial and temporal 
arrangements that cause peacekeepers to live in fortified compounds while having to respect 
curfews; and the organizational set-up of missions, including the types of communication 
channels and meeting platforms between populations and peacekeepers.
21
  In the following, it 
is explored how these organizational factors, in conjunction with the described discursive, 
political and security-related elements, shape the diagonal interoperability between FARDC 
military and MONUSCO blue helmets, starting at the macro level.   
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MONUSCO-FARDC macro-relations: conflict and collaboration 
 
Established in 1999 as a small liaison team to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka 
ceasefire agreement, what was up to 2010 called MONUC
22
 gradually transformed into a 
complex, multidimensional peacekeeping operation. With an annual budget of nearly USD 
1.4 billion and counting 19,784 uniformed personnel mid-2015,
23
 MONUSCO is the largest 
and most expensive UN peacekeeping operation in history. It is also one of the more 
controversial missions in terms of its impact on the ongoing violent conflict and its relations 
with the host country population.
24
 Since the adoption of a peace accord in 2003 by the main 
belligerents of the Second Congo War (1998Ð2003), armed violence of varying intensity and 
nature has been ongoing in the countryÕs east. As evidenced by the continuing proliferation of 
armed groups, running into the tens of dozens, MONUSCO presence contributes little to the 
demobilization of armed groups or addressing the drivers of armed mobilization.
25
 
Additionally, despite occasional contributions, the mission has generally not been able to 
effectively protect civilians against the harm inflicted by armed groups or the national army 
nor to address other sources of insecurity, like the rampant banditry that is a growing problem 
in many areas in the east. Due to the increasing emphasis on civilian protection in its mandate, 
and the general importance of security performance for host country populationsÕ perceptions 
of peacekeeping missions,
26
 it is particularly these weak security contributions that are at the 
root of the lukewarm international and local enthusiasm for the mission.
27
 
There is a substantial body of literature providing explanations for MONUSCOÕs 
weak security performance. These are generally divided into factors internal to the mission 
and the UN system, and those related to the political environment to which it is deployed. In 
relation to the missionÕs internal set-up and dynamics, some of the main factors highlighted 
are: the small number of personnel in relation to the vastness of the CongoÕs territory and 
amount of inhabitants; inadequate funding and insufficient means of transport and supplies; 
limited synergy between civilian and military components; and weakly developed 
mechanisms of communication with the population.
28
 In respect of factors relating to the 
wider UN system, the most salient elements advanced include: a lack of strong backing for 
MONUSCO from the UN Security Council, the broad formulation of the missionÕs mandate, 
representing the Ôlowest common denominatorÕ between the Congolese government and 
council members,
29
 and limited guidance as to the mandateÕs operationalization and 
prioritization.
30
 Unclear directions, in turn, widen the leeway for the interpretation of the rules 
of engagement under which contingents of troop-contributing countries (TCC) are deployed, 
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in particular as regards the operationalization of robust peacekeeping and the protection of 
civilians.
31
  
While MONUSCO is deployed under a Chapter VII mandate that authorizes the use of 
force for the protection of civilians, some of its major TCC, notably India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, have advocated a more classic approach to peacekeeping. Such an approach 
centres on guaranteeing impartiality and neutrality and the minimal use of force. By contrast, 
certain mostly Western council members, ironically primarily countries that do not contribute 
troops themselves, have advocated a more robust approach to peacekeeping, which includes 
active engagement in military operations against armed groups. Although some force 
commanders managed to temporarily push through a more proactive interpretation of 
MONUSCOÕs mandate,
32
 as also characterizes the FIB, the more conservative approach to 
peacekeeping has overall dominated. One reason is the preference of most TCC for low-risk 
behaviour, as is also evidence by the caveats they impose on deploying their troops. For 
instance, certain TCC refuse that their troops engage in foot patrols or patrol far from COBs. 
Together with the CongoÕs infrastructural deficiencies, such conditions have rendered the 
mission relatively inert and have limited its radius of action.
33
  
Aside from factors pertaining to the mission and the wider UN system, MONUSCO 
has been plagued by the difficult political environment in which it operates. Crucially, the 
Congolese government displays only half-hearted and wavering commitment to the UN 
mission and the objectives set in its mandate. In particular, it resists interventions that threaten 
existing power relations, often labelling these as Ôinfringements on its sovereigntyÕ. Such 
resistance has put MONUSCO in a difficult position, not only as its presence depends on the 
consent of the Congolese government, but also as it is mandated to reinforce and reform the 
state apparatus, including the security sector, as part of the consolidation of state authority in 
the east.
34
 In general, MONUSCOÕs role in army reform has been relatively limited, and has 
been confined to more technical interventions like training FARDC battalions and 
rehabilitating military infrastructure.
35
 This has not only been a result of the governmentÕs 
reluctance to address the more politically sensitive dimensions of defence reform, but also its 
opposition to the involvement of multilateral institutions in such reform, preferring bilateral 
defence cooperation agreements instead.
36
  
The political difficulties surrounding the peacekeeping missionÕs collaboration with 
the army also extend to military operations. From 2004 onwards, MONUSCO has assisted the 
FARDC with conducting military operations, including by providing transport, rations and 
fuel, medical and casualties evacuation, psy-ops (notably the diffusion of messages to enemy 
combatants) and the creation of safe corridors. In some cases, it has also engaged in more 
direct battlefield interventions, such as fire-support and search and sweep actions. In line with 
MONUSCOÕs mandate to support FARDC-led operations to disarm foreign combatants, more 
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comprehensive military collaboration initially took primarily place during operations against 
foreign rebel groups, like the Forces dmocratiques de libration du Congo (FDLR) and the 
Allied Democratic Forces-National Amy for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU). In 
2009, when the FARDC launched massive, Kivus-wide military operations against the FDLR 
and other armed groups, named first Kimia II and then Amani Leo, MONUSCO support was 
scaled up. These operations followed on the heels of the integration of thousands of rebel 
troops of the Congrs national pour la dfense du peuple (CNDP) and a number of other 
armed groups into the FARDC as part of a peace deal.  
The peace deal between the Congolese government and the CNDP, formalized by an 
agreement signed on 23 March 2009, starkly revealed the bad shape of FARDCÐMONUSCO 
collaboration, in particular in relation to information-sharing. The deal, including the 
modalities of army integration and the subsequent military operations, had been negotiated 
behind closed doors with the involvement of Kigali, the CNDPÕs long-time sponsor. 
MONUSCO had been entirely sidelined in the process, and had not even been informed of the 
joint military operations against the FDLR launched by the Rwandan military and the FARDC 
in January 2009. Fearing to lose further grip and influence over the evolving military 
dynamics, MONUSCO decided to collaborate with the FARDC in the Kimia II operations 
that started in March that year.
37
 One of the assumptions underlying this decision was that 
MONUSCO support to the FARDC would improve the latterÕs behaviour. As stated by a UN 
Secretary-General report on MONUSCO: ÔBy providing rations and logistical support to the 
troops involved in Kimia IIÕ, MONUSCO Ôcontinued to help prevent 16,000 troops from 
living off the populationÕ.
38
  
MONUSCOÕs involvement in Kimia II, however, drew widespread criticism from 
human rights and humanitarian actors, who highlighted the detrimental effects on the 
missionÕs impartiality, and the shrinking humanitarian space. They also expressed grave 
concerns about the high civilian costs.
39
 The hastily planned and badly executed military 
offensives provoked massive displacement and led to rampant insecurity. They intensified 
reprisal attacks on civilians by armed groups, and led to serious human rights violations 
committed by the Congolese army.
40
 Due to a variety of factors, including weak cohesion 
within units and the military as a whole, the low quality of command stemming from non-
meritocratic appointments, frustrations about bad service conditions, and a generalized focus 
on revenue generation, the FARDCÕs behaviour towards civilians is often poor, in particular 
during military operations.
41
  
The FARDCÕs widespread engagement in human rights abuses raised doubts about 
MONUSCO support to the operations and the extent to which this could be reconciled with its 
civilian protection mandate.
42
 In reaction, MONUSCO formulated a conditionality policy for 
support to the FARDC at the end of 2009, which provided the impetus for the development of 
the HRDDP (the due diligence policy). The conditionality policy consisted of a number of 
measures to ensure that MONUSCO-supported security activities, including joint operations, 
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confirm to international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law standards. These 
measures included: full MONUSCO involvement in operational planning; the screening of the 
commanders of the battalions selected for MONUSCO support; the suspension of support to 
units and commanders involved in serious abuses; and the joint verification of human rights 
violations. The implementation of these measures partly revolved around military-to-military 
monitoring and pressure, charging MONUSCO military with documenting and addressing 
abusive behaviour by the FARDC.
43
  
In part due to its ad-hoc conception, the conditionality policy was rolled out 
erratically. An inter-agency mission charged with assessing the policy in 2010 identified 
numerous obstacles to its implementation, including Ôthe adequate screening and monitoring 
of the behaviour of FARDC units receiving supportÕ and Ôapplying the policy consistently 
across the countryÕ. The mission also found that it was not possible at that point to 
demonstrate whether the conditionality policy was Ôhaving an impact on FARDC behaviour, 
which is a central objectiveÕ.
44
 What the missionÕs report failed to mention, however, was that 
one of the main factors undermining consistency in the policyÕs implementation was 
MONUSCOÕs limited political leeway. Crucially, in spite of the de facto deputy commander 
of the Kimia II/Amani Leo operations in North Kivu being an ex-CNDP general against 
whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) had issued an arrest warrant, MONUSCO 
continued collaboration with the FARDC. Yet, the political climate was such that this issue 
could not be addressed.
45
  
In 2012, the lukewarm relations between MONUSCO and the FARDC temporarily 
warmed due to their common interest in defeating a new Rwanda-backed rebel group, the 
Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), which grew out to be a major threat to Kinshasa. With the 
Congolese government realizing they needed the UN to contain this threat, collaboration and 
coordination between the two forces, particularly the FIB, substantially improved.
46
 This 
dtente, however, would not last long: At the start of 2015, MONUSCO officially suspended 
its participation in upcoming joint operations against the FDLR, as Kinshasa had nominated 
two ÔblacklistedÕ generals in leadership positions. Many FARDC officers viewed the 
suspension negatively, highlighting the inconsistency with MONUSCOÕs earlier decision to 
let the ex-CNDP general wanted by the ICC off the hook. The measures were also seen as 
paternalistic and as interference in the CongoÕs sovereign (military) affairs. Moreover, some 
FARDC officers emphasized what they saw as the UNÕs historic responsibility for the very 
creation of the FDLR problem. Not only did the UN fail to prevent or halt the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994, it also did little to stop humanitarian aid from falling into the hands of the 
Rwandan Hutu combatants who had fled to the eastern Congo (then Zaire) after the genocide 
together with thousands of refugees. This lack of oversight allowed these combatants to 
regroup militarily, paving the way for their later evolution into the FDLR.
47
 The FARDCÕs 
framings of the suspension of collaboration show how certain deeply held representations of 
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MONUSCO and the UN form a lens through which events are read and interpreted. 
Understanding these representations is therefore crucial for grasping diagonal interoperability. 
 
Seeing Self and Other: FARDC and UN militaryÕs mutual representations 
 
This section discusses the mutual representations held by FARDC military and officers of the 
Pakistani and Indian contingents of MONUSCO. These representations are anchored in broad 
generalizations of two complex and diverse entities at a high level of abstraction, which are at 
times shot through with national, ethnic and racial stereotypes. While FARDC officers mostly 
spoke about ÔMONUSCOÕ as an undifferentiated entity (sometimes equalled to Ôthe UNÕ and 
Ôthe international communityÕ), at other moments, they referred more specifically to the 
national contingents. For instance, some FARDC officers stated that the French-speaking 
troops from Benin deployed in the Rutshuru region of North Kivu in 2010 compared 
favourably to other MONUSCO troops. These peacekeepers were described as understanding 
more of the security situation, and of being closer to the population. Differences were also 
detected in relation to the South African troops, who were more often described in more 
positive terms. For one FARDC officer, this was in part because: ÔAt least they are African. 
They are our brothers. They understand usÕ.
48
 Yet Ôbeing AfricanÕ or being able to speak local 
languages did not always seem to make a difference for the better. As one intelligence officer 
commented on the Swahili speaking Tanzanian troops deployed as part of the FIB: ÔThe 
Tanzanians are very mean (mchants). They are hypocrites. They say one thing but do 
anotherÕ.
49
 Despite these generalizations and stereotypes, both MONUSCO and FARDC 
officers also articulated more nuanced views, especially when concerning individual 
experiences. Officers from both forces stated for instance that they could observe differences 
in behaviour between the various commanding officers of the other force. Such articulations 
of individual difference were however still combined with and contrasted against general 
representations. The latter primarily focused on notions of military professionalism and 
security performance, which appeared to serve as a point of reference in relation to which 
other differences (e.g. levels of ÔdevelopmentÕ, ÔcultureÕ) were articulated.  
 
FARDC discourses on MONUSCO: ÔTouristes armsÕ 
 
In line with findings by Higate and Henry,
50
 FARDC representations of blue helmetsÕ security 
performance revolved around peacekeepersÕ perceived spatial and security practices, and their 
access to technologically advanced military equipment. FARDC officers would, for example, 
highlight that MONUSCO troops only patrol on main road axes that are accessible by car, and 
have a limited radius of action, being clustered around their bases.  This limited spatial reach 
was seen as all the more surprising given the equipment available to UN troops. As noted by 
one officer:  
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They [MONUSCO] have all sophisticated and modern equipment. They have for 
example tanks, but all they do is drive around in the big towns, that makes no sense. 
But in the isolated zones, where the enemy is present and there is insecurity, we rarely 
see them. They have no impact on the ground.
51
 
 
These spatial arrangements were seen to have temporal implications, causing MONUSCO 
military to always intervene with considerable delay. As one lt.col. described: ÔThe 
MONUSCO always arrives too late on the scene [after the FARDC is already deployed], and 
then appropriates the fruits of our labourÕ.
52
 This perceived lack of (timely) action was also 
reflected in the running gag that the abbreviation MONUC (which continues to be more often 
used than MONUSCO) signifies Mission dÕObservation [instead of de lÕOrganisation] des 
Nations Unies en RD Congo, indicating how, in the words of one FARDC officer, Ôwe call it 
an observer mission, for all they do is observeÕ.
53
 Another domain of military practice in 
which MONUSCOÕs military competence was contested was intelligence and situational 
awareness. Several FARDC officers claimed that they always had to provide MONUSCO 
with all the information on armed groups, for the mission would otherwise have no idea what 
they were doing.
54
 In the words of one officer, MONUSCO operates like a Ôblind manÕ in the 
Congo.
55
  In the discourses of yet others, MONUSCOÕs limited knowledge and capabilities 
were portrayed as being at the root of role inversion. An FARDC civilÐmilitary relations 
officer explained it as follows: ÔThey [MONUSCO soldiers] learn a lot here; it is us who 
teach them. They often criticize us, but they are not open to criticism. So they come here to 
train us in what domainsÕ?
56
  
The circumscribed spatial reach of MONUSCO, in spite of the force having ample 
means of transport compared to the FARDC, was presented as standing in stark contrast to the 
Congolese armyÕs modes and zones of operating. The FARDC has a presence and operates in 
areas with limited accessibility, often by covering vast distances on foot in difficult terrain, 
like dense forest and mountain areas. While going on foot can be seen as illustrative of a Ôrag-
tag armyÕ, since partly induced by a lack of means of transport, when juxtaposed to UN 
troopsÕ reliance on vehicles, it was portrayed as a sign of ÔtoughnessÕ, of being more 
ÔgenuineÕ military than UN peacekeepers. The same inversion, or presenting a putative 
weakness as a putative strength, could be detected in relation to the FARDCÕs abominable 
service conditions. Rather than seeing these as signs of inferiority, they were generally 
presented as providing testimony to the FARDCÕs high levels of discipline, hence its 
superiority. In the words of one officer:  
 
They call the FARDC undisciplined, but we are actually very disciplined. In the US 
army they have everything, good salaries, social benefits, advanced weaponry. If a 
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soldier of the US army would be in the conditions that we are in, do you think he will 
remain disciplined?
57
  
 
The stark contrast in service conditions was often analysed in conjunction with MONUSCOÕs 
alleged abysmal security performance, leading to descriptions of blue helmets as soldats de 
luxe (luxury soldiers) or touristes arms (armed tourists), reflecting designations of 
peacekeepers also found in many other contexts.
58
 Much to the regret and sometimes anger of 
FARDC officers, these disparities in security performance and bravery are however not 
reflected in international appreciation for the two forces. One way in which this unequal 
appreciation is manifested is the distribution of medals. As an FARDC intelligence officer 
explained: ÔEach time, they invite us to the medal ceremony [for MONUSCO contingents], 
but we [FARDC] are never decorated, we are never thanked. The international community 
does not recognize our effortsÕ.
59
 FARDC personnel often explained these perceived 
differences in international appreciation by pointing to wider geopolitical factors, in particular 
global power asymmetries. 
One of the most widely circulating geopolitical narratives on MONUSCO within the 
FARDC is the idea that the UN mission is part of a wider conspiracy of imperialist powers to 
foster insecurity in the Congo. As one FARDC officer said: ÔWhat are they [MONUSCO] 
doing here? Sometimes we think they are here for fostering insecurity, for sowing chaos and 
confusion.Õ
60
 The reasons for the detrimental role of MONUSCO are believed to be twofold. 
First, it is thought that MONUSCOÕs presence in the Congo allows its personnel to enrich 
itself, both via high salaries and the (perceived) opportunity to engage in illegal forms of 
enrichment, like minerals trafficking. To prolong this ongoing lucrative presence, 
MONUSCO has to promote insecurity. This idea is well captured in the popular expression 
(in English) ÔNo Nkunda no jobÕ, which refers to the former leader of the CNDP, Laurent 
Nkunda. A second reason for MONUSCOÕs alleged contribution to insecurity is that the 
mission is an extension of (neo)imperialist powers that aim to maintain the Congo in a state of 
chaos in order to dominate it and plunder is rich resources. This idea is nourished by earlier 
experiences with UN activity in the Congo, in particular with the Organisation des Nations 
Unies au Congo (ONUC), the first UN mission that was deployed to the country in the 1960s. 
Within the Congo, many memorize the ONUC intervention as having been geared towards 
containing the anti-imperialist, nationalist, Lumumbist side with the aim of promoting pro-
Western forces that were friendly to Western business interests.
61
 The importance of these 
memories confirms Higate and HenryÕs findings that previous peacekeeping shapes 
perceptions of subsequent missions, and that historical context influences broader notions of 
bias.
62
 Indeed, many FARDC officers were convinced that MONUSCO is supporting the 
Ôenemy sideÕ, stating for example that the mission provides arms and ammunition to certain 
rebel groups. According to one officer: ÔWe see the FDLR and think: ÒHow do they get their 
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arms?Ó When we tried to conduct operations the MONUC DDR [sic]
63
 told us we had to stop. 
How do you explain that? Each time we get to the enemy, they tell us to withdraw.Õ
64
 Such 
stories highlight the complex interplay between geopolitical imaginaries and perceived 
security performance. Similar factors shape the ways in which MONUSCO peacekeepers of 
the Indian and Pakistani contingents view the FARDC, representations that equally centre on 
military professionalism and security performance.  
 
Blue helmet discourses on the FARDC: ÔThey have no pride in wearing the uniformÕ 
 
Reflecting the discourses of aid donors on the FARDC, which highlight its dysfunctionality,
65
 
the PakBatt and IndBatt officers contacted for this research were unanimous in their views of 
the FARDC as a rag-tag, disorganized, undisciplined and ÔunderdevelopedÕ military that 
engages in human rights abuses and makes a limited contribution to the populationÕs security. 
The following quote is illustrative in this respect:  
 
Troops can be controlled if there is some mechanism, however this army lacks 
command and control. Soldiers also tend to get drunk and take their weapons 
everywhere, there is no discipline at all. If they want to clean their weapon they shoot 
in the air. There are not even checks whether they wear their uniforms properly, so 
even at the basic level there is no discipline.
66
  
 
While in peacekeepersÕ narratives, nearly all dimensions of the FARDC were portrayed as 
ÔdeviantÕ, it was especially the workings of command chains and discipline that were seen as 
deficient, creating an image of ÔdisorderÕ. As an IndBatt officer commented: ÔA hierarchic 
system? I donÕt think it existsÕ.
67
 Similarly, a PakBatt officer observed how Ômilitary leaders 
do not seem to have the respect of their subalternsÕ.
68
 This state of disorder and chaos was 
linked to the seeming unpredictability of the FARDC, which was generally flagged as 
hampering collaboration: ÔEverything is possible here, everything can happenÉwe never 
know whatÕs going onÕ.
69
 
Aside from hierarchy and discipline, two other common themes in portrayals of the 
FARDCÕs military ÔunprofessionalismÕ were military equipment and fighting skills. Mirroring 
FARDC narratives on MONUSCO, military equipment stood central in assessments of the 
forceÕs security performance. As one PakBatt officer commented: ÔThey do not even have 
small arms, how will they drive tanks? They will drive them like tractorsÕ.
70
 Others 
highlighted the FARDCÕs inferior fighting skills, ascribing these to a lack of military training 
and education. In the words of an officer working with the TTF:  
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They have a totally different concept of fighting. We are used to having first cover and 
then fire, but they shoot and then run in the same direction as they fire. It is a very 
different concept. We had to learn them a lot.
71
  
 
This quote clearly reveals the experienced feelings of superiority in terms of military 
professionalism and how this feeds into a sense of paternalism, of having to ÔteachÕ and 
ÔguideÕ the FARDC.
72
  
  From the interviews, it emerged that Pakistani and Indian blue helmets generally 
identify three reasons for the FARDCÕs perceived underperformance and lack of military 
professionalism. The first relates to the FARDCÕs bad service conditions, including limited 
pay. As one COB commander explained: ÔThere is no order in this military. An army is a 
tough profession, if you get no benefits, why would you obey orders? ThatÕs why discipline is 
very loose.Õ
73
 The second reason is FARDC personnelÕs lack of motivation for serving in the 
military. As an IndBatt officer put it: ÔThey have no pride in wearing the uniformÕ.
74
 An 
officer from the same COB further elaborated: ÔThe only motivating factor for them right now 
is to have power. A weapon gives them access to powerÕ.
75
 A third reason that was commonly 
invoked was that the FARDC belongs to a ÔbackwardÕ society. Stating that Ôwhatever 
organization you have in the military, it is a reflection of your networks within the societyÕ, a 
PakBatt officer commented: ÔYou can not make a comparison between military of the NATO 
countries and the FARDC, it is a military in developmentÕ.
76
  
The importance attached to the CongoÕs ÔunderdevelopmentÕ for understanding the 
characteristics of its army could also be discerned in more general discussions on the country, 
which was often depicted as being in a lower stage of an evolutionary path towards 
civilization/modernization. For instance, one officer, after expressing his amazement at the 
absence of large-scale mechanized agriculture on such fertile land, commented: ÔThis country 
will remain in the same state for a long timeÕ.
77
 In sum, Pakistani and Indian blue helmetsÕ 
discourses on the FARDC reproduce the same undeveloped/uncivilized vs. 
developed/civilized dichotomy identified to play a role within military-to-military interaction 
within multinational peacekeeping forces.
78
  
 
Joint military activities: ÔWorking together apartÕ? 
 
The negative mutual representations held by FARDC and MONUSCO military also shone 
through in the way they spoke about joint activities. That collaboration was perceived to be of 
low quality is not surprising in light of the short time spent together and the rudimentary state 
of organizational mechanisms to promote and facilitate interaction. Peacekeeping troops are 
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only deployed to the Congo for a limited amount of time (generally between 6 and 12 months 
per assignment). This hampers the development of in-depth relations, especially since 
FARDC regiments also rotate regularly (albeit erratically, with important differences per 
regiment and sector, but generally every two years). Linguistic differences further undermine 
interaction. PakBatt and IndBatt officers rarely speak French (or any of the CongoÕs four 
official languages), while only few FARDC officers can communicate in English. 
Furthermore, there are almost no joint trainings, including cross-cultural ones, to facilitate 
collaboration. Additionally, spatially, the two forces are Ôworlds apartÕ, staying in different 
areas and bases, which limits informal interaction. Contact is mostly limited to formal 
occasions like joint patrolling or security meetings. Yet, due to mutual distrust and what are 
seen as deficient divisions of labour, joint security activities seem to nourish, rather than 
break down, negative representations. For instance, since MONUSCO often only provides air 
support during joint operations, FARDC troops feel they have to do the dangerous and dirty 
groundwork on their own. MONUSCO military, for their part, believe that the FARDC does 
not include them sufficiently in planning operations and provides them with selective 
information on what happens in operational zones.
79
 
One FARDC brigade commander was very straightforward about the shallow 
character of ÔcollaborationÕ: ÔThe MONUC is only there for propaganda or marketing. ItÕs 
like Coca Cola. They are there to trick us. These [joint] patrols are rather symbolic, itÕs only 
for taking some picturesÕ.
80
 Other FARDC officers similarly expressed the feeling that 
collaboration remained on a superficial level. Civilians working in the domain of civilian-
military interaction shared this observation. For instance, one human rights defender 
monitoring FARDC abuses said:  
 
The impact of MONUC on FARDC is really small, there is little interaction between 
the two and they stay pretty much separated. They all do their own business. The 
biggest impact is perhaps that it drives the FARDC to hypocrisy. To cover up their 
acts, which they would otherwise do more openly. They hide when the MONUC 
patrol passes, but afterwards they continue with business as usual. They do behave 
differently in front of MONUC troops, they fear them, they execute their orders 
differently. But this impact is only near MONUC bases, but not where MONUC 
hardly goes.
81
  
 
During informal conversations, some FARDC officers admitted they were primarily interested 
in obtaining fuel, rations and transport from MONUSCO. At the same time, they tried to 
avoid MONUSCO interference in their daily and security activities as much as possible, and 
provided them with limited information. Indeed, from observations it was gleaned that the 
FARDC shared information with COB commanders only selectively, often primarily for 
instrumental purposes. For instance, it was once witnessed how an FARDC regiment 
commander spoke to a COB commander in South Kivu about upcoming operations, for which 
he demanded fuel. However, the operations and intelligence officers of this regiment were not 
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aware of these operations, which were never held. It therefore appears that the presented 
operational plans were primarily a way to obtain fuel from the COB commander.
82
  
Non-UN foreign military working with the FARDC also observed the Ônot so jointÕ 
character of the ÔjointÕ activities with MONUSCO. As a European officer working with the 
FARDC in the framework of defence reform testified: ÔThere are no Òjoint operationsÓ here in 
North Kivu. The FARDC do not share information (É.) The ÒjointnessÓ is a total failure, 
there is no communicationÕ.
83
 The same officer explained that due to limited information 
sharing, joint planning was often merely hypothetical. Moreover, the FARDC commonly lack 
detailed operational plans and maps, and do not stick to the determined timelines, often due to 
logistical problems.
84
 Such loose time schedules and planning are fundamentally at odds with 
blue helmetsÕ own work practices, and their notions of military professionalism more 
generally. As they commented, they are used to Ôeverything running like clockworkÕ,
85
 
Ôrespecting the scheduleÕ
86
 and Ôdetailed advance planningÕ.
87
 Therefore, the FARDCÕs ad-
hoc and often reactive manner of working profoundly upset their ways of operating, causing 
them to fear collaboration.  
Indeed, PakBatt and IndBatt officers often assessed collaboration with the FARDC as 
difficult. Furthermore, they were generally convinced that jointly operating with the FARDC 
had not much impact on the FARDCÕs behaviour. Commenting on the joint patrols, one 
PakBatt officer said:  
 
When we patrol with them many are hungry and they are more occupied with their 
empty stomach. They see how we handle weapons, they observe how we treat 
civilians, they see how we behave as military. However, it is not clear this has a big 
impact on them.
88
  
 
Similarly, a TTF officer having conducted numerous trainings with the FARDC said:  
 
We can only do military training, no character building, thatÕs for the political 
leadership. Training helps them to some extent to become a soldier psychologically, 
but there are many other elements that determine whether they can become one. 
Especially morale, but also ideology. And soldiers march on their bellies. So without 
logistics, they will not have any morale. If these elements are not there, no matter how 
hard we try, we will not get them into the military mindset.
89
  
 
Additionally, several PakBatt and IndBatt officers conveyed the impression that explicit 
efforts to improve the conduct of the FARDC, like by raising the issue of abuse during 
meetings and exerting pressure to stop or alter certain practices, met with limited success. For 
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instance, a COB commander in South Kivu told how every security meeting with the 
FARDC, he would bring up the fact that the military were asking for money at roadblocks, as 
he had been told by human rights defenders. However, each meeting, the FARDC would 
simply deny this. Since the commander and his troops could not observe this practice when 
patrolling, given that the FARDC would never stop passers-by in view of MONUSCO 
vehicles, they felt they had limited leverage on the Congolese army and could do little to stop 
the extortion.
90
  
In spite of these difficulties, MONUSCO officers did seem to be aware that the 
FARDC has superior situational awareness and intelligence, and that cultivating good 
relations is necessary to guard access to that information. For instance, a Muslim FARDC 
brigade commander told how he had once received a Koran from a PakBatt COB commander. 
In his eyes, this was not primarily an act of solidarity between co-religionists, but related to 
the fact that Ôthey [MONUSCO] know they need us to surviveÕ.
91
 Indeed, one COB 
commander admitted that despite its limited functionality, the FARDC did Ôhold the lineÕ 
when it comes to containing armed groups and that they Ôdo go out deep into the bushÕ.
92
  
In sum, when looking at practices and experiences of interaction, we can observe that 
most of the Ôintegrative mechanisms and conditionsÕ identified by Elron et al.
93
 are absent, ill-
developed, or do little to foster integration. For instance, rather than promoting integration, 
internal divisions of labour and shared information flows accentuate asymmetries and foster 
distrust. Furthermore, while there are similarities between the FARDC and MONUSCO in 
terms of hierarchical and bureaucratic set-up, which is theorized to facilitate interaction, in 
relation to day-to-day functioning, the two forces see more deviance than common ground. 
For instance, while MONUSCO military do not see a regular hierarchy at work in the 
FARDC, FARDC personnel judge MONUSCOÕs inertia as abnormal for a military force. 
Hence, structural similarities between the two forces do not facilitate joint activities.   
 
Concluding reflections 
 
As emerges from the above discussion, military from the Pakistani and Indian contingents of 
MONUSCO and the FARDC have fundamentally different interests in, motivations for and 
perceptions of their mutual relations. While blue helmets fear the FARDC, they also need 
them for intelligence and ground operations in the fight against armed groups. Furthermore, 
they are mandated to reinforce the FARDCÕs capacity, supervise it and improve its conduct, 
which fosters feelings of superiority that are importantly fed by racial and national 
stereotypes. This mix of contradictory feelings makes their attitude towards the Congolese 
military one that can best be described as Ôpaternalistic (pretended) partnershipÕ. The 
FARDCÕs attitude vis--vis MONUSCO, in turn, is strongly geared towards drawing 
immediate (material) benefits while limiting interference in its business, a position that can be 
conceptualized as Ôopportunistic (pretended) partnershipÕ. These diverging approaches to 
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Ô(pretended) partnershipÕ reflect and further undermine already limited mutual understanding 
and respect, pointing to weak diagonal interoperability. 
The weak diagonal interoperability between UN and FARDC forces can be ascribed to 
a plethora of overlapping organizational, discursive, security-related and political factors. 
Organizationally, limited mechanisms have been developed for fostering closer integration, 
causing the two forces to remain Ôworlds apartÕ. Politically, integration is hampered by the 
difficult relations between MONUSCO and the Congolese government, and the asymmetries 
in wealth and power between the two forces, as reflected in the varying availability of 
advanced military equipment and soldiersÕ service conditions. These asymmetries feed into 
and are aggravated by certain imaginaries of the international political order. FARDC 
personnel deeply believe in MONUSCOÕs complicity with (neo)imperialist conspiracies to 
divide the Congo and plunder its natural resources. Officers from MONUSCOÕs Indian and 
Pakistani contingents, on the other hand, circulate a geopolitical narrative centred on the 
dichotomy between developed/civilized vs. undeveloped/uncivilized nations, clearly placing 
the Congo in the latter category. While most of the literature on peacekeeping links such 
essentializing images to the Global North/Global South division, in the case of MONUSCOÐ
FARDC interaction, it are UN peacekeepers from Ôthe Global SouthÕ who draw upon 
racialized cultural stereotypes to frame military colleagues who are equally from Ôthe SouthÕ. 
This indicates that Ôwithin SouthÕ military-to-military interaction may be shaped by similar 
discursive tropes as ÔNorth-SouthÕ military relations.  
In fact, within FARDCÐMONUSCO interaction, the salience of the 
developed/underdeveloped dichotomy seems to overshadow that of a shared military culture 
and professional identity, identified by Ben-Ari and Elron as allowing Ôfor a common base of 
fellowship and loyalty among members of different national culturesÕ.
94
 Instead, military 
professional identity appears largely a divisionary mechanism, constituting a symbolic 
battleground where inequalities and wider tensions between UN peacekeepers and the 
Congolese military are played out. To the FARDC, the presence of UN peacekeepers is a 
permanent reminder that their own security performance is internationally judged to be 
insufficient, which incentivizes them to exalt their military superiority. UN peacekeepers, for 
their part, are mandated to supervise, correct, teach and train the FARDC, which generates a 
climate in which the FARDC cannot be but ÔinferiorÕ in military terms. These contrasting 
views on each otherÕs presence shape and are shaped by mutually contested security 
performances, whereby each force claims to provide more securityÐand more efficientlyÐ than 
the other.  
The resulting weak diagonal interoperability between the two forces clearly 
undermines the effectiveness of joint military activities and reduces the scope for mutual 
influence. This calls some of the premises on which MONUSCO support for FARDC 
operations is based, as well as the expectations surrounding the HRDDP, into question. While 
no definite conclusions can be drawn based on this study, its findings do preliminarily 
indicate that MONUSCO presence, monitoring and coaching have limited structural influence 
on the overall behaviour of the FARDC. Certainly, this is not only the result of the uneasy 
collaboration between FARDC and MONUSCO military, but relates to an array of factors, 
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including MONUSCOÕs minimal political leverage in the Congo, and the limits to externally 
driven security sector reform more generally.
95
 Yet these findings do highlight the need for 
more reflection on the ways such strange battlefield fellows could become more friendly 
forces, and on how to create the conditions for mutually beneficial cross-fertilization. 
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